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THE VIABILITY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS
A DEFENSE TO STRICT LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA
Mack E. Barham*
Judges, lawyers and professors of law are indebted to Professor Wex
Malone for his many contributions to the law of delicts in Louisiana.
Moreover, so many of us are deeply indebted to him for the stimulus
he has supplied to our efforts toward attaining professional fulfillment.
I personally feel a great debt of gratitude for his teaching and writing
which gave the Louisiana Supreme Court insight into the duty-risk analysis
which he and Professor Green fostered. This simplified and clear approach
to causation was of great assistance to me personally in many opinions
rendered on the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Dean Prosser prognosticated
that the duty-risk analysis would eventually eclipse and replace the prox-
imate cause approach. Unfortunately, the intermediate appellate courts
of Louisiana did not respond to the supreme court's challenge in this
area. Had the courts of appeals so responded, the growth of this judicial
tool for problem solving in the area of delicts might very well have spread
nationwide.
The courts of this state also owe Professor Malone gratitude for his
clarity of thinking, his scholarly direction and his supreme effort to avoid
the pitfalls of "strict liability." Even with his guidance, the following
article will illustrate that the lawyers and judges have not been capable
of making a stable determination of or even a fair direction for the multi-
faceted problem. Professor Wex Malone was the first to recognize that
in the subtlety of the opinion in Reymond v. State' was the beginning
of a judicial realization that liability for ultra-hazardous activities, nuisances
and other related matters should be removed from the law of property
and resolved under the delictual articles 2315 through 2324. Professor
Malone has been many things to many people. His teachings and writings
have challenged my best efforts. With this in mind, I offer the following
in his honor.
Reacting to the inequitable results arising from a strict application
of the doctrine of contributory negligence, the Louisiana Legislature, in
1980, passed Act 431, commonly known as the comparative negligence
statute. A portion of Act 431 has been codified in Civil Code article 2323,
which states:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for
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damages, its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury,
death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly
as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim
for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of
damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree
or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering
the injury, death or loss.
The comparative negligence statute has no effect whatsoever on a deter-
mination of liability; its application is limited solely to the computation
of damages. While the statute's limited function would seem, at first
glance, to imply easy implementation, this is not so in the strict liability
context. A problem is created in that the language of the statute ties the
application of comparative negligence in computing damages to situations
in which contributory negligence would be a defense.
Three defenses to a claim premised on strict liability have developed
through judicial rule. The seminal case in the strict liability area, Loescher
v. Parr,2 decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1975, set out three
defenses to a strict liability action. The Loescher court stated that the
defendant would be relieved from liability when the harm resulted from
(1) an irresistible force, (2) the fault of a third party, or (3) the fault
of the victim.' The first two defenses do not bring questions of com-
parative negligence into play. An inquiry into the applicability of the com-
parative negligence statute must therefore necessarily focus upon the
defense of victim fault.
The search for the contours of "victim fault" is complicated by the
expansive imposition of strict liability. Louisiana, through its Civil Code,
has chosen to impose a form of "strict" liability in areas in which the
common law has not traditionally imposed strict liability. In traditional
common law jurisdictions, strict liability has generally been imposed when
the activity giving rise to liability falls into the broad categories of either
ultrahazardous activity or some type of products liability. Louisiana, on
the other hand, bases strict liability on an elaborate codal scheme which
premises liability on specific legal relationships and not on the basis of
fault. In Loescher, the Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the princi-
ple of legal fault imposed under articles 2317 through 2322 in the follow-
ing manner:
When harm results from the conduct or defect of a person or
thing which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, a
person legally responsible under these code articles for the super-
vision, care, or guardianship of the person or thing may be held
liable for the damage thus caused, despite the fact that no per-
2. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
3. Id. at 447.
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sonal or negligent act or inattention on the former's part is
proved.'
Several post-Loescher cases have extended Louisiana concepts of strict
liability. In Turner v. Bucher,' strict liability was imposed under Civil
Code article 2318 upon parents for harm caused by their children. In
Holland v. Buckley,' the court abandoned its long standing line of deci-
sions which held that there had to be some negligence on the part of
an animal owner before imposing liability for harm caused by the animal
and, instead, found owners to be strictly liable under Civil Code article
2321 for harm caused by their animals. Utilizing Civil Code article 2322,
the court in Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.7 imposed a nondelegable duty upon
an owner to keep his building in such a state of repair that it would
not create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Then, in Jones v. City
of Baton Rouge,' the court extended principles of strict liability to public
bodies.'
In none of the previous cases did the court equate contributory
negligence with victim fault such that a defendant could be relieved from
liability on the basis of a plaintiff's mere contributory negligence. Victim
fault was limited to assumption of the risk, which was recognized as a
defense to strict liability in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.," a case
which preceded Loescher and its progeny by several years. The scope of
Langlois was somewhat different from that of Loescher and the cases
that followed Loescher in that Langlois involved an untrahazardous ac-
tivity. When ultrahazardous activity is involved, a much more stringent
standard of liability is imposed. In fact, the liability imposed for
ultrahazardous activity has been termed "absolute liability" as opposed
to the strict liability set out in Civil Code articles 2317 through 2322 for
which the court has created the three defenses previously mentioned. A
decision to apply the doctrine of absolute liability is demanded when, after
a balancing of the interests involved, it is determined that although the
activity in question is highly dangerous, the benefit of the activity in ques-
4. Id. at 446.
5. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975).
6. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
7. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978).
8. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980).
9. Louisiana courts have not felt constrained to utilize the strict liability approach
to resolve disputes between persons whose relationship is not established by statutory man-
date. For example, in Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400
(La. 1978), the court imposed a liability closely akin to strict liability in pedestrian-motorist
situations. The court couched the duty owed by a motorist to a pedestrian in terms of
"more than ordinary care." Id. at 404. The court studiously avoided using traditional strict
liability, and opted instead to phrase its decision in terms of negligence. Despite the conflict-
ing terminology, the practical effect of the decision was to institute strict liability in pedestrian-
motorist cases.
10. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
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tion is such that it should be allowed to take place; however, the risks
inherent in the performance of the activity dictate that the risk creator
bear all costs of whatever damage might result. Thus, according to
Langlois, in settings which give rise to absolute liability, the only factor
which will rebut the presumption that an affirmative duty has been
breached is a showing of victim fault in the form of assumption of the
risk. Notably, the court found this to be so since contributory negligence
presupposes original negligence on the part of the defendant, and
negligence is not an ingredient of fault in a strict liability action.
However, in Dorry v. Lafleur,II a plurality of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, speaking through ad hoc Justice Fedoroff, made a sharp depar-
ture from the Langlois line of decisions. The Dorry decision distinguished
Langlois, finding that Langlois involved ultrahazardous activity, which
is a special circumstance. Dorry left the Langlois decision intact to the
extent that it found contributory negligence not to be a defense to an
action involving ultrahazardous activity. Moreover, the Dorry plurality
suggested that contributory negligence would not constitute victim fault
so as to be a defense to a strict liability action where the activity involved
was either unnatural to the locality or a commercial enterprise where a
business could support the loss. However, in all other instances, the Dorry
court found that the circumstances under which a plaintiff's contributory
negligence should bar his recovery in a strict liability action should be
developed on a case-by-case basis.'" Thus, Dorry held that contributory
negligence may in certain cases be a defense to strict liability actions.
The Dorry position was strengthened by the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co.'" The court, through
Justice Lemmon, attempted to establish a workable structure for the task
of imposing strict liability. The Kent decision put strict liability on an
equal footing with negligence in that the test used in determining strict
liability was to be the same as that used for determining liability in
negligence cases. Justice Lemmon found that, in a typical negligence case
against the owner of a thing which causes injury, the plaintiff must prove
that under the circumstances the thing presented an unreasonable risk of
harm which resulted in the damage and that the owner knew or should
have known of the risk, but nevertheless failed to render the thing safe
or to take steps to prevent the damage caused. When a cause of action
is premised upon strict liability, the elements are the same except that
the plaintiff is relieved of proving that the owner knew or should have
known of the risk involved. According to the court:
11. 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981). Dorry involved a patron of a skating rink injured by
a slip in a puddle of water under a leaking roof. Strict liability was imposed on the owner
of the rink under Civil Code article 2322.
12. Id. at 561.
13. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982). Kent involved strict liability under Civil Code article
2317, the liability of custodians for things.
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Under strict liability concepts, the mere fact of the owner's rela-
tionship with and responsibility for the damage-causing thing gives
rise to an absolute duty to discover the risks presented by the
thing in custody. If the owner breaches that absolute duty to
discover, he is presumed to have discovered any risks presented
by the thing in custody, and the owner accordingly will be held
liable for failing to take steps to prevent injury resulting because
the thing in his custody presented an unreasonable risk of injury
to another." '
Thus, according to Kent, in a strict liability action the standard for deter-
mining liability is to presume the owner's knowledge of the risk presented
by the thing under his control and then to determine the reasonableness
of the owner's conduct in light of that presumed knowledge.
In view of Kent's revelation that negligence and strict liability are
so closely related to each other, there seemed to be no barrier left to
a decision that contributory negligence is a defense to strict liability. This
was precisely the position taken by Justice Dennis in his concurring opin-
ion in Kent. Accepting the Dorry holding insofar as Dorry found that
Loescher strict liability is much broader than the common law doctrine
of strict liability for abnormally dangerous conditions and activities, Justice
Dennis stated that most of the circumstances which give rise to strict liabil-
ity under articles 2317 through 2322 have been neither ultrahazardous nor
unnatural to the locality. He also noted that the Loescher opinion has
been criticized for disregarding the traditional test of blameworthiness by
imposing liability upon a defendant who had neither actual nor construc-
tive knowledge of the defective condition of the thing in his custody.
Justice Dennis suggested that the harshness resulting from this applica-
tion of strict liability may be ameliorated to a large degree if the doctrine
of comparative negligence is found to be applicable to articles 2317 through
2322.11
While there have been no Louisiana Supreme Court cases specifically
affirming the Dorry/Kent rationale, intermediate courts of appeal which
have had to develop the doctrine of victim fault as a defense in strict
liability cases have accepted the Dorry holding that contributory negligence
may be equivalent to victim fault. Perhaps one reason intermediate courts
have been inclined to follow the Dorry reasoning is their desire to avoid
the sometimes inequitable results to the defendant of a refusal to allow
contributory negligence as a defense when the plaintiff's conduct has clearly
been a cause in fact of the harm but falls short of constituting assump-
tion of the risk.
An example of this reasoning may be found in the pre-Dorry case
14. Id. at 497.
15. Id. at 502 (Dennis, J., concurring).
19841 1175
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
of Sullivan v. Gulf States Utilities Co.' 6 The plaintiff was a security guard
employed by a company occupying premises owned by Gulf States Utilities
Company. The plaintiff was injured when he drove his truck into a con-
crete pier on the premises. Several piers had been constructed on the
grounds, and at the time of the accident they were not marked, painted
or barricaded. The greyish color of the pier in question blended impercep-
tibly into the asphalt that covered the parking lot which was unlit. The
plaintiff was temporarily blinded by the headlights of an oncoming vehi-
cle in the parking lot which caused him to become distracted and run
head on into the pier. The plaintiff knew that a number of piers had
been constructed in the parking lot and that protective barrels had been
removed from around most of the structures. The plaintiff stated, however,
that he did not see the pier that he hit until an instant before impact.
The trial court denied plaintiff's recovery on the basis of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence. In the ensuing appeal, it was asserted that con-
tributory negligence did not apply to a claim based on strict liability under
article 2317. The first circuit affirmed the trial court's decision and held
that victim fault directly encompassed mere contributory negligence. Ac-
cording to the court:
It would be ironic in this case for the defendant to be able
to escape liability in a negligence action because of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence, yet be held liable under a strict liability
theory when the plaintiff has been equally at fault in bringing
about the harm. We think the policy reasons underlying Loescher
v. Parr point away from such an ironic result. Loescher was based
on a proposition that, out of two innocent parties, the owner or
guardian of a thing should pay for any damage caused by that
thing. We do not have two innocent parties in this case, as the
word innocent is understood in strict liability law. For purposes
of this case, we think the measure of conduct necessary to achieve
the appellation "contributory negligence" is the same measure
necessary to amount to "victim fault" under Article 2317." 7
The fourth circuit also departed from a strict application of Langlois
in Carpenter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." Following Justice Den-
nis' rationale in Kent, the Carpenter court found that social policy alone
was the factor which traditionally prevented courts from recognizing con-
tributory negligence as a defense to strict liability. The court found,
however, that the Civil Code imposes strict liability for conduct which
would not necessarily warrant the imposition of strict liability under the
common law tradition. The court went on to state that in situations such
16. 382 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 384 So. 2d 447 (La. 1980).
17. Id. at 189-90. See also Stewart v. Sam Wallace Indus. Co., 409 So. 2d 335 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1981), writ denied, 413 So. 2d 497 (La. 1982).
18. 411 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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as these, there is no policy basis for applying the social policy borrowed
from the common law which prohibits contributory negligence as a defense
to an action in strict liability. Citing Dorry with approval, the court held
that contributory negligence may indeed be a defense to an action in strict
liability where the defendant's conduct concerns neither ultrahazardous
activity nor the liability of a manufacturer for its product.
The first circuit adhered to its decision in Sullivan in Buchanan v.
Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury.'9 Citing Dorry, Kent, Sullivan and
Carpenter as the bases of its holding, the court reaffirmed that contributory
negligence may be the equivalent of victim fault so as to bar an action
in strict liability. The court found that the Louisiana concept of fault
encompassed both strict and negligent liability claims; therefore, it is not
theoretically inconsistent under Louisiana law to hold that the fault of
contributory negligence is a bar to recovery even though the defendant's
liability is premised on some legal fault other than negligence. The
Buchanan court went on to state that where both parties are free from
negligence, strict liability places the burden of the loss on a person legally
responsible for the thing which caused the loss. Thus, where the conduct
of the plaintiff contributed to his damage, this conduct should be judged
in the same manner whether the standard of liability applied is strict liabil-
ity or negligence because the duty imposed on the defendant is the same
in both cases. The court concluded that "[w]ith the advent of comparative
negligence . . . the harsh effect of the 'all or nothing' contributory
negligence rule will be substantially tempered." 20 By this statement, the
first circuit indicated, as did Justice Dennis, that comparative negligence
principles should apply to apportion damages in a strict liability action.
When the supreme court granted writs in Entrevia v. Hood,2 final
resolution of the question of contributory/comparative negligence as a
defense to at least "relational" strict liability under articles 2317 through
2322 appeared probable. The case involved an abandoned farmhouse
located in a remote, rural area. Although the building was surrounded
by a fence and posted with "No Trespassing" signs, the plaintiff and
her friend entered the premises and ascended the steps to the building.
The plaintiff was seriously injured when the steps to the house collapsed
as she descended. The court of appeal had reversed a finding of no liability
because the plaintiff had proved the steps were defective and the defen-
dant had failed to prove any affirmative defense.2" Thus, the court, con-
fronted with a claim of strict liability asserted by a trespasser, clearly
had the opportunity to add another chapter to the "victim fault" story;
but the court declined to do so. Perhaps motivated by the near hysteria
19. 426 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
20. Id. at 726 (footnote omitted).
21. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
22. Entrevia v. Hood, 413 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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and confusion generated by Kent,23 the court chose instead to paint with
a broader brush and to lay to rest the ambiguities involved in the decision-
making process in strict liability actions. The result is an opinion master-
ful both in its clarity as to the nature of strict liability and in its instruc-
tive value to the lower courts as to how to properly resolve a strict liabil-
ity dispute. Moreover, while the court sidestepped the victim fault ques-
tion, it did lay the seeds for its final resolution.2"
The court, through Justice Dennis, stated that a plaintiff may recover
in strict liability under article 2317 or 2322 only if the injured person
shows that the building or its appurtenances posed an "unreasonable risk
of injury to others, and that his damage occurred through this risk." 5
If these elements are proven, the owner will not be absolved of his liabil-
ity due to his lack of knowledge of the condition of the building. Neither
will the owner be relieved from his liability by showing that the defect
was not easily detectable.2 6
The majority emphasized that the owner could not be held responsi-
ble for all injuries resulting from any risk posed by his building; he will
be responsible only for those injuries caused by an unreasonable risk of
harm to others. Moreover, it was the responsibility of the court to assess
whether particular risks were encompassed within the owner's obligations
from the standpoint of justice and social utility. In making such a deci-
sion, the judge must consider "moral, social and economic values as well
as the ideal of justice."" Such a consideration would lead the trial judge
to an intelligent and responsible decision.
The Entrevia court found that the judicial process involved in deciding
whether a risk is unreasonable in a strict liability sense is similar to the
process used to determine whether a risk is unreasonable in a traditional
negligence setting. In Kent, the court suggested that a proper approach
was to presume the owner's knowledge of the defective condition, then
to evaluate the owner's actions in light of this presumed knowledge. En-
trevia rejected this approach, stating that such a method is "indirect and
entirely unnecessary once the judge understands that the standards or pat-
terns of utility and morality which he must consider in deciding if a risk
is unreasonable will be found in the life of the community." 28
The methods of determining negligence as opposed to strict liability
under article 2317 are not identical in all respects. The major distinction
between the two theories is that a defendant in a strict liability case can-
23. Crawford, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Torts, 43 LA. L. REv. 607 (1982).
24. See infra text accompanying note 67.
25. 427 So. 2d at 1148.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1149.
28. Id. at 1150.
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not defend by showing his inability to know or prevent the risk. Such
a showing would preclude a finding of negligence.29
Using this analysis, the Entrevia majority found that "a knowingly
unauthorized entry of another's fenced and posted immovable property
is legally and morally reprehensible conduct." 3 The court noted that the
building in question was isolated and unproductive and that the only
dangers posed by this property were those typically associated with a run-
down old farmhouse. Based on these facts, the majority reasoned that
the magnitude of risk posed and the gravity of the harm threatened "were
small in comparison with that of other risks presented by things in our
society." 3 It was held, therefore, that the building posed no unreasonable
risk of harm, and plaintiff's recovery was denied.32
The analysis of the court in Entrevia is in fact similar to the garden
variety "duty-risk" approach. The plaintiff was injured at an abandoned
building used by her for a secret rendezvous. The peril complained of
was the very quality which attracted and exposed her to the risk: the
deserted, dilapidated and isolated nature of the building made it unlikely
that her encounter would be interrupted. Under these circumstances, the
owner of the building cannot be said to have a duty to protect this plain-
tiff from this risk. Another plaintiff, perhaps a child, exposed to the risk
for reasons other than the existence of the risk itself, might be covered
by a duty imposed on the defendant.
As Entrevia makes clear, the policy reasons for imposing strict liability,
at least as concerns article 2317 actions, are basically the same as those
operative in negligence cases. Moreover, the judicial process involved in
resolving both of these types of dispute is similar. Armed with such
realities, there should be an easy transition from the unsatisfactory com-
promise of Dorry, which limits the equation of victim fault with con-
tributory negligence to a case-by-case determination, to a more workable
approach which would further refine the understanding of the concept
of strict liability by recognizing the application of contributory/comparative
negligence in disputes under Civil Code articles 2317 through 2322. In
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Justice Watson concurred in the decision but found that the plaintiff's injury was
caused by her own fault. He found, therefore, that the plaintiff was barred from recovery
due to her assumption of the risk. Id. at 1151 (Watson, J., concurring). Justice Dennis,
however, chose not to go the traditional route taken by Justice Watson. He opted instead
to continue the process of refining and re-defining the concept of strict liability in Loui-
siana. Justice Lemmon, in assigning additional concurring reasons, characterized the ques-
tion in more traditional duty-risk terms. Strict liability gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge of the defect, and, given this knowledge, what is the duty of the owner to remedy
the defect and protect this plaintiff from the particular risk incurred? Id. at 1151 (Lemmon,
J., concurring).
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speaking to the bar about the ramifications of Entrevia, Justice Dennis
observed:
A majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court has not decided
whether victim fault, which is a defense to [article] 2317 strict
liability, includes contributory negligence. But the policy reasons
for refusing to recognize contributory negligence as a defense to
some forms of strict liability do not appear to be present in [arti-
cle] 2317 strict liability. The conventional economic theory underly-
ing strict products liability is that defendants, who are manufac-
turers or sellers, are in a position to distribute the loss among
the consuming public by insurance or product pricing and they
are in a position to reduce losses by marketing a better product.
In the other forms of strict liability at common law, there is an
element of willful creation of an unreasonable risk to others by
abnormally dangerous conditions and things. But most of the
things covered by [article] 2317 strict liability, such as the magnolia
tree in Loescher v. Parr, are neither ultrahazardous nor unnatural
to the locality, and many of their custodians, such as the owner
of the vacant farmhouse in Entrevia, are not engaged in an enter-
prise which permits them to spread the cost of risks among others.
Moreover, comparative negligence is being applied increasingly
even in strict liability cases by other states, most notably by
California, the originator of this type of strict liability. If we
recognize that the policy reasons for imposing [article] 2317 strict
liability are primarily the same as those for negligence liability,
and further accept the reality that the judicial process for deter-
mining the unreasonableness of a risk or the imposition of a duty
is the same in both of these areas of law, it would seem that
a just result would require the expansion of comparative
[negligence] principles to include [article] 2317 strict liability. This
result would be consistent with the foundation principle of our
delictual responsibility law that a person must repair the damage
caused another by his fault, but only so much as is caused by
his fault. And it would more fully restore Louisiana's civilian
heritage of comparative negligence which was lost when the
Supreme Court ignored the former version of Civil Code Article
2323 and imported the exclusively common law idea of con-
tributing fault as a bar to recovery.33
In Hyde v. Chevron,3" the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has already made this transition. In an attempt to discover the cur-
rent state of contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability in Loui-
33. J. Dennis, Address at the Annual Meeting of the Louisiana Association of Defense
Counsel 10-11 (May 1983) (emphasis added) (on file with Louisiana Law Review).
34. 697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1983).
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siana, Judge Wisdom went through a case-by-case analysis of decisions
made by intermediate Louisiana appellate courts subsequent to Dorry, and
made an exhaustive review of the Kent decision and its effect on con-
tributory negligence as a defense to strict liability in Louisiana. This exer-
cise resulted in the court's finding that previous decisions by the Fifth
Circuit," and the district court decision in Hyde, had misinterpreted the
law in Louisiana in asserting that only victim conduct amounting to
assumption of risk would relieve the defendant of liability in a strict liabili-
ty action under Louisiana law. The Fifth Circuit held that contributory
negligence does constitute a defense to a strict liability claim under the
present law of Louisiana. In dicta, the Hyde court stated that the com-
parative negligence statute should apply to the defense of contributory
negligence in strict liability cases. The court quoted Professor Plant:
[T]here is nothing in the basic strict liability policy that requires
that defendant pay all and plaintiff fault be ignored. A similar
view is warranted as to parents, owners of animals, and owners
or custodians of things. For reasons that have roots deep in the
history of the Louisiana Civil Code such persons carry the burden
of strict liability; but the Louisiana courts have repeatedly held
that the obligation is not absolute and can be extinguished by.
plaintiff's negligence.36
At present, the Fifth Circuit is following Dorry with regularity as it
relates to actions other than those involving products liability or ultra-
hazardous activities. For example, CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gulf
Transmission37 involved the venting of natural gas, which the court found
not to be an ultrahazardous activity giving rise to absolute liability. The
plaintiff's alternative theory of recovery was strict liability under article
2317. The court found that liability could not be imposed under article
2317, since the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and thus barred from
recovery.
Barring any unforeseen developments, the application of con-
tributory/comparative negligence in most strict liability cases seems im-
minent. However, the products liability area seems to be posing some dif-
ficulty for the courts. With no Louisiana guidance in the area, the federal
courts have grappled with the question and have failed to reach a definitive
answer. In Coburn v. Browning Arms Co.," Judge Politz reviewed re-
cent Louisiana authority on strict liability, including Dorry and Kent. He
summarized his conclusion as follows:
35. See Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981).
36. Id. at 629 (quoting Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40
LA. L. REv. 403, 417 (1980)). '
37. 709 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1983).
38. 565 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. La. 1983).
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[T]he teachings of Dorry and its progeny do not undermine the
doctrinal basis for strict products liability first explicated in the
seminal case of Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599,
250 So.2d 754 (1971). . . . [Thus], contributory negligence is not
a defense in a strict products liability case .... The policy reasons
warranting application of the contributory negligence defense in
article 2317 and 2322 cases do not obtain in products liability
litigation, where the manufacturer's affirmative act of distributing
its unreasonably dangerous product in the stream of commerce
eventually culminates in consumer injury . . .3
In another very recent products liability case, Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,'4
the Fifth Circuit completely ignored both Dorry and Kent, citing only
Langlois and Loescher for the proposition that assumption of the risk
alone is equivalent to the "victim fault" which defeats a strict liability
claim. The Bell majority could have easily reached the same decision by
citing Dorry for the proposition that contributory negligence does not con-
stitute a defense to an action grounded in products liability due to the
policy reasons underlying the products liability action.4 '
In Lewis v. Timco, Inc.,4 2 the Fifth Circuit has taken the opposite
approach under federal law. There, plaintiff Lewis was injured while work-
ing on a jack-up drilling barge in the coastal waters of Louisiana. A piece
of equipment that plaintiff was operating malfunctioned, causing the ac-
cident. The district court found that the equipment had a design defect
which rendered it defective and unreasonably dangerous. The district court
also found that plaintiff was negligent in his use of the equipment, and
on that basis, plaintiff's recovery was reduced according to the extent
of his negligence. In the appeal which followed, the Fifth Circuit faced
the issue of whether the general maritime law rule of comparative
negligence applies to a strict products liability case. On original hearing,
the court found that while comparative fault has long been the generally
accepted doctrine in maritime torts, in a strict products liability action
comparative negligence principles should not apply because public policy
demands that the burden of injuries caused by defective products be placed
on the manufacturer."' On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed
this holding.
39. Id. at 748 (citations omitted).
40. 709 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. Rehearing was granted in Bell on October 14, 1983. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 717
F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit has certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court
the question of whether contributory negligence is a defense to products liability. Id. at
183. Thus, it may soon be seen whether the Louisiana Supreme Court will stand behind
the Dorry decision as it relates to products liability and hold that contributory negligence
is not a defense.
42. 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc, 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983).
43. Id. at 1254-55.
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The decision handed down by the court on rehearing is of special
interest because the court addressed policy reasons for imposing a com-
parative fault scheme. The plaintiff argued that the concepts involved in
negligence and strict liability were not comparable, and that application
of comparative negligence principles to this case would thwart the public
policy of the State of Louisiana. The court addressed these issues, but
first found it helpful to review the doctrine of comparative fault as ap-
plied under maritime law. The court first recognized that admiralty courts
have applied comparative negligence principles to both fault and non-fault
based liability cases for many years. Since a major objective of maritime
law is to achieve uniformity, the maritime law has traditionally resisted
any doctrinal change which might interfere with this objective. The court
pointed out that under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) the
court must "take into consideration the degree of negligence attributable
to the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly." 4 4 DOHSA encom-
passes claims for deaths caused by defects in products. If comparative
negligence principles were not applied to maritime products liability cases,
anomalous results would be achieved. For example, if a worker's death
on the high seas was caused by a defective product, the recovery would
be reduced on account of the worker's negligence. If the worker was only
injured by the defective product, then his recovery would not be reduced.
Also, since DOHSA applies only to accidents occurring more than a marine
league from shore, if comparative negligence principles were not applied
uniformly to all maritime products liability cases, plaintiffs would be
treated differently depending upon where a fatal accident occurred."5
The court found that, if comparative negligence principles did not
apply to maritime products liability cases, non-uniformity would also result
in the area of multiparty litigation. For example, if a negligent plaintiff,
negligent defendant, and the manufacturer of a defective product were
all held jointly liable for injuries, the plaintiff's negligence would reduce
his recovery from the negligent defendant but not from the manufacturer.
In the case of defendants held jointly and severally liable, the negligent
plaintiff would be able to recover full damages from the manufacturer,
so that in effect the result would be as if there were no doctrine of com-
parative negligence with regard to the negligent defendant."
The court listed the traditional doctrine of unseaworthiness as a final
example of an area in ,vhich uniformity would be adversely affected by
failure to apply comparative negligence principles. Should a vessel be
rendered unseaworthy due to a defective product, the manufacturer of
the product would be held to a stricter standard of liability than the vessel
owner, since the plaintiff's negligence would be a factor in determining
44. 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1982).
45. 716 F.2d at 1428.
46. Id.
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recovery against the vessel owner but not against the manufacturer. The
court also predicted that seamen would attempt to escape the comparative
fault principles applicable to the doctrine of unseaworthiness by styling
their cases "products" cases. If comparative negligence principles were
rejected in products cases, the court felt that "many maritime torts of
our circuit will become products cases with the companion problem that
the courts of this circuit would be favored over more convenient courts
by seamen with a choice of forum." ' 4' The court clearly believed that a
rejection of comparative negligence principles in maritime products liability
cases would lead to inconsistent and anomalous results throughout the
entire field of maritime law.
The Fifth Circuit next addressed Lewis' argument that a plaintiff's
negligence cannot be compared with a defendant's fault for strict liability
purposes because the two concepts are incongruous. This argument sur-
faces often in cases involving contributory or comparative negligence and
strict liability. A review of cases from common law jurisdictions which
had decided whether to apply comparative negligence principles in strict
products liability cases48 convinced the Fifth Circuit that the majority of
courts were moving towards applying comparative fault in such cases. The
court, therefore, found no reason not to apply comparative negligence
in maritime products liability cases. The conceptual problems of compar-
ing negligence and strict liability did not bar the application of comparative
negligence principles in the Lewis case.
The final argument made by the plaintiff was that an application of
comparative negligence principles to a products liability action would
frustrate the policy of the State of Louisiana, in whose territorial waters
the accident occurred. The court noted that it had recently certified to
the Louisiana Supreme Court the question whether Louisiana law
recognized contributory negligence as a defense to a products liability
action. 49 In spite of this fact, the Fifth Circuit stated: "While Louisiana
courts do not appear to have applied comparative fault principles to strict
products liability cases, the state has no 'significant policy' against doing
so.''" After a brief discussion of the Louisiana comparative negligence
statute, the Fifth Circuit concluded: "While we may be uncertain in this
reading of Louisiana law, we are confident that recognition of comparative
fault in products cases will not 'frustrate' a dedicated policy of
Louisiana.""
47. Id. at 1429.
48. Id. at 1429-31. The court discusses, inter alia, the leading cases of Edwards v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1976) (Mississippi); Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
49. See supra note 41.
50. 716 F.2d at 1431.
51. Id. at 1432.
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The court summarized by stating that general considerations of fairness
and efficiency require that comparative negligence be a defense in maritime
products liability actions. The court stated that such a defense is essential
to maintaining uniformity in the maritime law. The court therefore
reinstated the decision of the district court.
Judge Politz, who wrote the original Fifth Circuit decision which held
that comparative negligence did not apply in maritime products liability
cases, authored a strong dissent. Judge Politz stated his belief that the
majority opinion was at odds with the principles underlying strict liabil-
ity. In his opinion, strict liability and comparative fault are not compati-
ble concepts. He stated that historically strict liability did not develop
alongside of the law of negligence, but rather evolved separately and was
derived from the law of warranty. Strict liability is a species of liability
without fault, neither based in negligence nor contract. Judge Politz stated
that the principles of maritime strict liability and strict products liability
are based on the rationale that the injured person is unable to protect
himself adequately from the potential harm. 2
Judge Politz stated that products liability actions focus not on the
quality of the act causing the injury, but on the product itself. The pur-
pose behind strict products liability is the reduction of the risks imposed
on society by defective products. Liability is imposed upon the manufac-
turer because it is felt that the "manufacturing enterprise" is better equip-
ped to bear the cost of injuries occasioned by defective products through
including this cost as an element of product cost. Strict products liability
is designed to protect society as a whole, and Judge Politz found that
the "relationship between specific plaintiffs and defendants is of secon-
dary importance; it is considered subservient to the interest of the public
as a whole.""
After his consideration of the policies underlying strict products liabil-
ity, Judge Politz considered the policies behind the comparative fault doc-
trine. He found that the term "fault" implies some blame and is the
equivalent of negligence. The concept of fault presupposes a duty or obliga-
tion to conform to a certain standard of conduct: the focus is upon the
nature of the act itself. In a negligence action, there is no problem with
comparing the fault of the parties; indeed, the state of the law today
is that such comparisons should be made, as this is seen as the most
equitable method for apportioning liability. However, there is no require-
ment of traditional fault in a strict liability situation. Judge Politz likened
the comparison of a plaintiff's fault with the defendant's strict liability
to "an attempt to measure the amount of water in an empty glass.""
52. Id. at 1433 (Politz, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1434 (Politz, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1435 (Politz, J., dissenting).
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Since strict liability is essentially liability without fault, Judge Politz found
it "simply illogical to attempt to quantify fault where admittedly none
exists.""
Strict liability has come into being in situations where, as a matter
of policy, the risk of damages should fall on the strictly liable party. Thus,
strict liability, as perceived by Judge Politz, allows a plaintiff in certain
situations to escape his own negligence. As a result, Judge Politz found
that the real question faced by the court in the Lewis case was "whether
to accept strict liability, specifically strict products liability, as meritorious
and apply it without reducing plaintiff's recovery for simple negligence,
or to signal the demise of strict liability as a basis for legal accountability
in tort." 6
Realizing that inequitable results are often brought about by the ap-
plication of strict liability, but believing that policy goals require that the
basic doctrine be preserved, Judge Politz offered an alternative to the
comparing of fault in a strict products liability case. He suggested that
causation be compared as a basis of apportioning liability. He pointed
out that the operative element in every strict liability action is the causal
connection between the hazard or defect and the injury. If the plaintiff's
actions are partially responsible for causing the resulting harm, Judge Politz
felt that an appropriate reduction in recovery would be in order. However,
the focus of such an inquiry would be on the causal relationship between
the plaintiff's conduct and the injury, not on the "normative aspects"
of plaintiff's conduct. Judge Politz reasoned that fault and causation are
not equivalent because fault relates a specific act to the actor's respon-
sibility, whereas causation relates the act to the result. Questions of causa-
tion are not based on the reasonableness of the act but are focused on
whether there is a "nexus between the act and the result." 7 Thus, even
in a strict liability case, the plaintiff's recovery could be reduced depend-
ing upon whether or not the plaintiff contributed to the cause of the ac-
cident. Judge Politz felt that such an approach would equitably appor-
tion responsibility in a manner consistent with the policies of strict
liability."
From the cases reviewed thus far, it appears that the weight of author-
ity (both in Louisiana and the federal Fifth Circuit) would conclude that
comparative negligence applies to actions grounded in strict liability. On
the basis of Dorry and Kent and their offspring, it would seem that con-
tributory negligence is a defense to all strict liability actions not involving
products liability or ultrahazardous activity. Of course, the Louisiana
Supreme Court will soon answer the question with respect to products
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1438 n.11 (Politz, J. dissenting).
58. Id. at 1438-39 (Politz, J. dissenting).
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liability with its upcoming decision in Bell. Additionally, while Lewis was
a case decided strictly under the general maritime law, it is conceivable
that the decision could have some persuasive effect on the Louisiana
Supreme Court. At any rate, it should be relatively clear in strict liability
cases not involving products or ultrahazardous activity that once con-
tributory negligence is found, the comparative negligence statute should
necessarily apply to the apportionment of damages. A review of cases
decided pursuant to the comparative negligence statute, however, will
reflect that in practice this may not be the case. 9
The cases that have been decided under article 2323 have tended to
adopt language from an article by Professor Alston Johnson prepared
in conjunction with a comparative negligence symposium compiled by the
Louisiana Law Review soon after the comparative negligence statute was
adopted, but before its effective date."' In his article, Professor Johnson
divided tort cases into three broad categories: (a) cases in which a defen-
dant's duty extends to the protection of a plaintiff against the plaintiff's
own carelessness; (b) cases in which the defendant is not liable because
the plaintiff's conduct has produced a situation for which the law should
not require a reasonably prudent person to prepare and respond; and (c)
those that fall into neither category, in which the victim's fault and the
defendant's fault may be weighed in the balance.'
The first case decided under the Louisiana comparative negligence
statute was Frain v. State Farm Insurance Co." The decedent was a pa-
tient in a mental hospital who was being treated with drugs for a severe
emotional disorder. While out on a temporary pass, the decedent bor-
rowed the defendant's car and was involved in an accident which resulted
in her death. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action on behalf of
the decedent's minor daughter, alleging that the defendant negligently con-
tributed to the death of the decedent. The trial court dismissed the suit
on the grounds that it stated no cause of action. The second circuit found
that a cause of action did exist. The court's decision adopted the language
in Professor Johnson's article with respect to the three categories of tort
cases. The court found types (a) and (b) to be "strict" duty-risk cases,
and agreed with Professor Johnson that contributory negligence does not
apply in those types of cases. Thus, the court reasoned that comparative
59. Civil Code article 2323 is applicable only to a cause of action arising after August
1, 1980. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 7. Therefore, there is very little case law interpreting
the comparative negligence statute, and none interpreting it as it relates to strict liability.
60. Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV.
319 (1980).
61. Professor Johnson argues that comparative negligence should apply only in type
(c) cases. Id. at 337-38. But see Plant, supra note 36, at 412-14 (arguing that comparative
negligence principles can apply to the apportionment of damages in strict liability cases,
because the statute refers to the "fault" of the defendant).
62. 421 So. 2d 1169 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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negligence did not apply in those cases. The court found that this par-
ticular case was a type (a) case in which the defendant had a duty to
protect the decedent against her own actions under the circumstances,
thereby implying that comparative negligence would not serve to reduce
the plaintiff's recovery. 3
The next case decided under the comparative negligence statute was
Bays v. Lee." The plaintiff's minor son, a pedestrian, was injured when
he was struck by a taxicab driven by the defendant. The trial court, find-
ing for the plaintiff, did not apply the comparative negligence statute.
It was contended on appeal that this was an error on the part of the
trial court. The fourth circuit quoted, with approval, Professor Johnson's
article to the same extent that it was quoted in Frain. The court found
that this case fell into category (a) in which the defendant's duty extended
to protect plaintiff from his own negligence. This holding was based on
the fact that Baumgartner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.6" abolished the defense of contributory negligence in a suit by
pedestrians against motorists for injuries. Finding that contributory
negligence was not a defense, the court held that comparative negligence
likewise did not apply to this situation.6"
The third and final case decided to date under the comparative
negligence statute, Dulaney v. Travelers Insurance Co.,67 involved a slip
and fall. The plaintiff was injured on defendant's premises when he slip-
ped and fell in a one-inch deep drainage trench in which a thin layer
of mud had accumulated. The trial court found for the defendant on
the basis that the drainage depression was not a premises defect for which
the defendant would be liable under article 2317. The trial court reasoned
that no liability attached because no unreasonable risk of injury was
created. The first circuit did not address the issue of defendant's strict
liability since it found that the defendant was negligent. In considering
whether to apply the comparative negligence statute, the first circuit
followed the lead of the second and the fourth circuits and adopted the
language from Professor Johnson's article. The court found that this case
was a type (c) case in which the victim's fault and the defendant's fault
should be compared. The court found that the plaintiff had the duty to
see and avoid any visible hazards, but that in this case the plaintiff had
not breached that duty. The court, therefore, found the plaintiff guilty
of "[zero] percent negligence.' '68
With respect to whether comparative negligence principles are ap-
63. Id. at 1173.
64. 432 So. 2d 941 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
65. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
66. 432 So. 24 at 944-45.
67. 434 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 583.
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plicable to actions grounded in strict liability, the only statement which
may be made with certainty is that "the jury is still out." When one
initially considers that strict liability is a species of liability without fault,
the application of comparative negligence principles appears incongruous.
However, when it is also considered that Louisiana imposes strict liability
in areas in which strict liability would not traditionally be imposed, it
does not appear quite so incongruous to apply comparative negligence
principles. The key language of Civil Code article 2323 is "when con-
tributory negligence is applicable." The Louisiana courts, considering that
s'trict liability under Civil Code articles 2317 through 2322 is dissimilar
to traditional principles of strict liability, have, in recent times, indicated
that contributory negligence is applicable to actions grounded in strict
liability. Specifically, the plurality in Dorry stated that contributory
negligence may be applicable to a claim based on strict liability and that
whether it should apply to a specific action will be decided on a case-by-
case basis. The Dorry plurality excluded cases involving products liability
and ultrahazardous activity from its holding. The United States Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, however, could not decide whether Dorry was con-
clusive as to the products liability issue. As a result, the Fifth Circuit
has recently certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court the question of
whether contributory negligence is applicable to a products liability case. 9
Thus, it will now be necessary for the high court to review the plurality
decision in Dorry and make the decision on the contributory
negligence/products liability issue, once and for all.
While a decision regarding the issue of whether contributory/com-
parative negligence applies to a products liability claim is on the horizon,
it would seem that with respect to other strict liability claims, namely
those arising under articles 2317 through 2322, the answer to the com-
parative negligence question is evident. To the extent that contributory
negligence has been allowed as a defense to such strict liability claims,
comparative negligence principles should be used to apportion damages.
This solution, which has been espoused by some commentators, would
certainly comport with the language of the statute itself.
Moreover, former Civil. Code article 2323,70 largely ignored by Loui-
siana courts in favor of the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence, 7" was not limited by its language to only negligence actions
under article 2316. While article 2323 was not applicable to the action
imposing liability without regard to want of care by the actor envisioned
69. See supra note 41.
70. "The damage caused is not always estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed
or injured; it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner of the thing .has
exposed it imprudently." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by
1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1).
71. F. STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 49 in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 69-70 (1977).
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by article 2315, article 2323, which clearly embodies a notion of com-
parative fault, was applicable to cases of presumed or imputed negligence,
imprudence, or want of skill under articles 2317 to 2322. Therefore, with
the exception of the absolute liability under article 2315 as recognized
in Langlois, there has always existed authority, codal at least, for the
imposition of comparative negligence in all other classes of tort cases,
including "strict liability." Articles 2317 to 2322 impute a lack of care,
diligence and skill to the keeper or custodian when the persons or things
in his custody act to cause damage. It can be said that these articles are
founded in a form of negligence by imputation, and cannot be fairly said
to give rise to liability without negligent fault or want of care.
Given the apparent inevitability of the application of comparative
negligence to some types of "strict liability" actions, the methodology
for such an application takes on special significance. The standard for
comparing "fault" is ignored by article 2323. Therefore, the best stan-
dard for evaluation would appear to be the degree of causation or con-
tribution attributable to each party responsible for the risk. At the same
time, the unreasonableness of the contribution in moral, social and
economic terms should also be considered.
This is the approach espoused by Justice Dennis, the author of the
opinion in Entrevia, at least for actions under Civil Code article 2317.
In comparing the fault of a defendant whose thing has caused
damage to a contributorily negligent plaintiff, we should benefit
from our dawning realization that the judicial process involved
in determining whether a risk is unreasonable under [article] 2317
is very similar to that employed in determining whether a risk
is unreasonable in a traditional negligence problem, and in deciding
the scope of duty or legal cause under the duty-risk analysis. If
we can by this process distinguish risks which are unreasonable
from those that are reasonable, certainly in the same way we can
judge whether one risk is more unreasonable than another. I sug-
gest, therefore, that the process we should follow in a [article]
2317 case would be something like this:
First, by focusing independently upon the defendant's thing and
the plaintiff's conduct, we determine if each created an
unreasonable risk of harm.
Second, we determine if each risk contributed to the accident.
Third, if both risks were unreasonable and contributed to the
accident, we determine the magnitude of unreasonableness of each
risk in terms of the same moral, social and economic considera-
tions we use to determine that each was unreasonable in the first
place.
Fourth, we allocate to each party his proportionate responsibility
for the injury depending upon his percentage of the combined
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unreasonableness of the risks that contributed to the accident.72
Entrevia v. Hood provides the foundation upon which rules for the
correct application of comparative negligence to strict liability actions can
be built. Through its clarity, advocates, judges and jurists are provided
a beacon to negotiate the difficult policy questions underlying the risk-
shifting process. Certainly, this is better than the ad hoc approach of
Dorry v. Lafleur.
72. J. Dennis, supra note 33, at 12-13.

